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THE

SUPREME COURT

Uf THE STATE UF UTAH

I ,'

l

nt

l [

f -Ap µe 11 a r1 t ,

vs.

Case No. 19019

!1r''ll/C:P & RIU GRANDE WESTERN
f,'_l\ I LRUAD and STATE OF UTAH
[1C:PARTMENT UF TRANSPORTATION,
Defendants-Respondents.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
I

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a personal

injury action brought by the plaintiff to

recover for injuries he received when the truck he was driving
was struck by a train.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
This matter was tried before the Honorable J.

Dennis

Frederick, of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake
County,
3,

1982.

sitting without a jury, on November 30 through December
At the conclusion of the evidence,

the court found that

neither defendant was negligent, and that the sole proximate
cause of the accident was the negligence of the plaintiff, and
entered judgment,
,,-,,Jc; nf

r

no cause of action,

for the defendants.

Find-

r'act and Conclusions of Law were prepared by counsel for

l«"'l ltuad.

Copies of

the Findings of Facts and Conclusions of

Law are attached hereto as Appendix "A".

The plaintiff moved to

the Findings of Fact, and also moved for a new trial.

I

I

I

t

These motions wert:' den i '"ci t1y

t

•11r-1

111..·

r j,.,

Jlr

llr

•_·r1t• , .. ,I

f

'ri

January 1 3' 1 qs 3.
11

The plaint

it

reversed, and havec

l__ I-'

l 11 l

I

k ,-

,'l:I•

-.-, i i

Ill I '

•1f

The plaintiff-appellant

11;

,,,

I I l
/ll' N

I

I

I

t 1· Lil .

f·\l']';-;

tr.ii,

after Mr. Hobbs), was a truck <lrivc"r

3ctinn, Austin Hobbs (here:
f!Jr \vestern Coal Carriers a·

the time of the accident which gave rise to this lawsuit.

Mr.

Hobbs had been a truck driver for Western Coal Carriers for
approximately six years before the time of the accident.
4 71.)

(Tr.

During that period he nad received numerous safe driving

awards from Western Coal Carriers.

(Tr. 4 7 5. )

On April 6, 1979, representatives of the Department of
Transportation for the State of
Transportation), the Denver

&

(hereinafter Department of

Rio Grande Railroad (hereinafter

Railroad), and the City of Price met together to discuss and

rnak;

plans for the renovation of a railroad crossing located at Carbo 1
Avenue in the city of Price, Utah.

(Tr.

19 0. )

The Department o·

Transportation had prepared the roadway plan for the Carbon
Avenue crossing.

(Tr.

169-70.)

A copy of a portion of Exhibit

P25 is a map of Price City, anrl is attacherl hereto as Appendix
11

8 11

5

One of the purposes of the a b1)'1e-rJe>1;1-r

rwet

determine what should be dune ·wi tr1 the" Ca1·.ri,-m /\venue
(approximately 11,000 vehicles per

Jdy

t

rat tic

I 1'. 251)) during the

construction of the Carbon Avenue crc1ssi n,3.
-2-

was t·J

Several alternative·

The railroad proposed that the
t

r,.- ,J,-r,,urc>•1 rr, First West because First West was already

' ' 11,-

''

that

'• ,,_
111•

,;,,,Ji,:
iklJLltt111r_flt

tci

i• t

of

is,

it already had in place flashing

the apprcJach of a train.

(Tr.

284,

,-Jf Transportation proposed that the traffic

rirst last 1n Price.

(Tr.

284.)

The first East

•iJ•1 not have the crossing safety or warning devices that

-r,,s-trl•j

present at either First West or Carbon Avenue.

(Tr.

20 3.)

rhe traffic load at the first East crossing prior to the detour
,;as approximately 230 vehicles per day.

(Tr.

251.)

The other

Jlternat1ve was to move the traffic through the Carbon Avenue
cr,,ss1nrJ while the construction was in process, without utilizing

a ,ie tour.

(Tr.

19 2. )

Department of Transportation had the ultimate and final
iecis1on with respect to the detour,
crossing would be used.

(Tr.

and decided that the First

218-19.)

There was some

discussion with respect to whether additional safety or warning
devices would be placed at the first East crossing while the
detour and construction at Carbon Avenue were in process.

The

Department of Transporation again made the final decision that no
additional safety or warning devices would be placed at the
cr•Jc;s1ng.

(Tr.

219.)

The railroad acquiesced in the decision to

•1et-.:wr the traffic to First East.
f,•Jwever,

that a

r• ss 1 nrJ dur 1 ny
-t ,,

(Tr.

286.)

The Railroad felt,

flagman should be present at the First East
the pen,iency of the detour and, accordingly, one

i•Hied tt1ere.

The flagman was not,

however, posted at the

•T"ss1n•J duriny the night but only during the day.

-3-

(Tr.

341. )

) t

necessary t•J l1a··
consequently.

(Tr.

I,]

r1'

j

I

thcr·

the presence of a11
dent.

t

.'/

Si:l.)

clt'[ct

The· rcitlr

normal 41J m.p.h. down tcJ

c

'J'

)lt

r

''·[·'·"·

Jr.

3b

·l.

Jt·r

et te(·

intrJ

11

I

A diagram of the First East Cross1nc1 1s set forth in Appenc.
"Cu.

The distance from the bec;innin·d 'Jt

the· crossin'g to the

point of impact, traveliny in the direction that Mr.

Hobbs was

traveling,

is approximately 1U6 feet.

(Tr.

it would have taken Mr. Hobbs apµroximately 24 seconc'

488),

At the speed of 3 m.p.h.

to traverse that distance.
The construction and detour on the Carbon Avenue crossing
commenced on April 23, 1981.
day, Mr.

(Tr.

31JO,

318-19.)

On that same

Hobbs was working an atternoon shift driving a coal

truck for Western Coal Carriers.

His work µeriod on the day of

the accident commenced at apµroximatel1 1:00 p.m.

(Tr.

4 7 9. )

His work on that day cnns1sted on hauling coal from various mine
locations to the site locations nf the various coal users who
utilized the services of Western ()al r'arriers.

Much of this

work was confined to eastern ar«1 suut herri "tah.

(Tr.

The distance driven by Mr.
approximately 200 miles.

Horrt)s "" tt,"' •Jay
(Tr.

•it

112-14. I

the'

·,ns

116. I

Mr. Hobbs approachecj the First l·a,,r ca1lroad cr•JSsinCJ wht'fc
the accident took place at apprnx1rnat,cl·/ lll:Utl P·"'·

-4-

(Tr.

l U7. I

•it

P7,

r,xf11i,Lt
Jt t

,,,

,;h1cr1 is a d1a(Jram of the First East
r1t:reto as

,-ir

Appendix "C"

As Mr.

t•' cross tt1e tracks he had to go very

i'''"

(Tr.
11,,,•

·f"''"1 '"I,

Hobbs

""h ich Mr.

was only abuut

487-88.}

Hobbs was able to cross the railroad
3 m.p.h.

(Tr.

488. )

Mr.

Hamilton of the

ric:;Jartment of Trans[Jortation testified that railroad crossings
dangerous if they cannot be crossed at a safe speed.

166.)

(Tr.

He also testified that a loaded truck should be able to

cross a crossing at approximately 30
and prudent.
As Mr.

(Tr.

in order to be safe

182.)

Hobbs proceeded across the tracks, any vision that he

might have had down the tracks was obscured by various objects.
The objects consisted of a box car parked about
on the side rails at the crossing (Tr.
a

large tree in foliage,

53,

and a car or van.

150-300 feet east

343), a house, a shed,
(Tr.

60.)

Mr.

Hobbs could not clearly see up the tracks, because of the obstructions,

until after he was beyond the third set of tracks on the

railroad crossing.

(Tr.

61.)

Mr.

Hobbs testified that the front

steering axle was just going across the track when he saw the
light on the train and heard the whistle.
Mr.

Harvey,

(Tr.

488.}

who was a supervisor, or road forman of equipment

tor the railroad, was in the lead engine of the train on the
"i

•1ht

111•-.:1r1t

Mr.

JI:-'

of
1-s.

the ace ident for
I Tr .

SS 'l - b ll • )

lhe purpose of observing the crew
Mr.

Harvey testified that he first saw

Hubbs truck after it had moved past the warning signs, at

,,ii11ch it was supposed to stop,

but didn't.

-5-

(Tr.

582-84.)

He

proceeding onto the tracks n"tw1tl1'ot
ing, was unusual,

t""Je1=-

111

!f'j'l

, 1\ 111 r 1 .'

see trains on the main 11rw tr''''
across the crossing.

1nri1 n,

111rt1I

r r

i

\

J l

n

l

l

r 1J1

111,,

',..',1

;../.j

f[f_'

n·

>IJ)

(Tr.

'It,

,,1'1

I hci l

Mt'

Hobbs would stop his truck on th<C cr,)SSltJJ,

rJ11t

line track, and wait for thP train t" p.:iss,

notwithstanding he

I

shcn't 0t the ma,,

would then be directly in the path of any trains which may be
approaching on any of the other tracks.

(Tr.

586-87.)

Mr.

Harve.y did not notify the engineer that Mr.

Hobbs'

the track until the train was only 150 feet

from the point of

impact.
Mr.

truck was on

568.)

(Tr.

Leonard,

the front end brakeman on the train involved it

the accident, testified that the train was only approximately 50
feet away from the truck when he first saw it and started taking
action to stop the train.

(Tr.

432.)

Mr. Ganser, the engineer,

had previously seen the truck when the train was about 150 feet
from the crossing, but took no action other than blowing the
whistle.

(Tr.

405-06,

426.)

As described above, Mr.

Harvey, whc

was conducting an observation test of the train crew, saw the
truck even before Mr. Ganser and observed that he hadn't stopped
at the crossbucks, but did not attempt to warn the train crew
until the train was about 150 feet from the crossing.
68,

It was necessary for Mr.

582-88.)

man, and Mr.

Harvey,

to yell to Mr.

Leonard,

(Tr.

565-

the front brake-

an observer in the cab of the train

Ganser,

the engineer on the train,

warn him that the truck was on the tracks.
-6-

(Tr.

in order to
432.)

Mr.

1.

'

»,t

t

,,,rh<"t

'"•

1

11

·•1 ll1at

lhc> consoie in the cab of the engine consti-

1r11 1 ·»d1cit ,-,t an •Jbstruct1on of vision to the left for the
I

t

t

I ,-

•

"11 .'Ir.

H»t1t1s

ht.· '"''' •Jf

Ure

(Tr.
(Tr.

4 9 0. I

I

s.Jw the train he accelerated in an attempt to
truck off of

489. I

the tracks before the train

The train hit the truck just behind the

After the collision,

the train proceeded a full

hlnck west to the Carbon Avenue crossing before it came to a
stnp.

The cab of the truck was impaled on the front of the

engine from the time of the collision until it came to rest a
block west of the accident.

( Tr.

4 7- 4 8. )

damaqed condition of the cab of Mr.
an hour

Hobbs'

Because of the severely
truck,

it took nearly

for the emergency personnel who arrived on the scene to

extricate Mr.

Hobbs from the truck.

(Tr.

48.)

Officer Douros of the Carbon County Sheriff's office testified that,
accident,

after he conducted a full

no citation was issued to Mr. Hobbs with respect to the

accident.
Mr.

investigation of the

(Tr.

74.)

Hobbs was taken to a hospital as soon as he was removed

trom the truck and he was treated for a fractured pelvis, fractured ribs,
1980, Mr.

accident.

and a punctured lung.

(Tr.

90.)

On September 29,

Hobbs underwent back surgery as a consequence of the
(Tr.

84, 80.)

HoDhs had sustained a
,,,,. a1:c1dent.

(Tr.

Dr.

Robert H.

Lamb testified that Mr.

20% permanent partial injury as a result of

84.I

Mr.

Hobbs still suffers from a great

•1eal of pain and has been substantially limited in his activities
because of the accident.

(Tr.

545-46.)

-7-

DF:FEl'JDANT

COMP ..'\NY

UI· NVf.l·

iJ.\,

RAif.PU,\Ll

MATTER Ur
Utah Code Ann.

·1··

"

«!•

··I
·1

,.

'1.!

I

!I !
i 11
[11
I !•
l

i:r

I

\;
11

i

'··

\I

Sh- 1- l

i I

I

cl

., t

t I

ii

1

,_it

" 1<-· I ·,:t._'t-i

tc.1 I

l -

make and maintain good anr1 suff 1c1ent •.-r ss1n 1s at pr,1nts ·,.,!1ereo
1

any line of travel crosses 1 ts roa,J."

Th'-

of what

constitutes a "good and sutE1c1ent" crossiny was interpreted in
Denkers v. Southern Pacific Co., 52 Utah 18, 171 P. 999 (19181:
The court, in a case of this kind, might
properly charge the JUry in general terms
that a good and sufficient crossing is a
crossing that is sutf icient and ordinarily
safe for the traveling public to pass to and
fro over it, keeping in mind its location,
whether in a sparsely settled or populous
and the character and volume of the
traffic that ordinarily may be expected to
pass over it.
171 P. at 1002.
In Bridges v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 26 Utah 2d 281,
488 P.2d 738 (1971), the Utah Supreme Court denied recovery to
the plaintiffs in a wrongful death action when their nineteen
year old son was hit by a train, but,

in the decision, spelled

out the tests which must be applied to determine the safety of
railroad crossings:
To authorize a Jury to find negligence
on the part of the railrr)ad in not taking
additional precautions, there must be evidence
to indicate that the
was more than
ordinarily hazardous, i.e., there must tJe
something in the configuration of the land,
or in the construction of the railroad, or in
the structures in the vicinity, •)r in tl1e
nature or amount of the travel on the highway,
-8-

'Jr in other conditions, 'which renders the
warning employed at the crossings inadequate
t<i ·warn lhe
puhl ic of dan<Jer.
j

t

7 lK.

All

the physical surroundings must be evalu-

'1fc'tPrmi11e ·whether a particular crossing is abnormally
These factors

include those mentioned in both the

1d<JeS and Denkers cases.
The case of Newman v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 547
F. 2d 439

(5th Cir.

1977), evaluated the physical conditions of a

railroad crossing where a train-car collision occurred at night.
The driver of the car approached the crossing at a speed of 3040 m.p.h.
<'rossing.

and did not stop at a stop sign

posted at the

The train, which was dark in color, was approaching

the crossing and the train crew was ringing the train's bell and
blowing its horn.

The locomotive's lights were shining as well.

In addition, a temporary flashing red light had been installed

over the traffic, although it was not a typical railroad sema[Jhore.

In finding that the railroad crossing was unsafe and that

the defendant railroad company had a duty to warn, the court
said:
We begin with the principle that failure to
stop at a railroad as required by law "shall
not of itself defeat recovery
Finding that the horn was sounding and the bell was ringing but that the
plaintiff did not hear them, and assuming
that the red flashing light was working, the
district court ruled that these warnings were
not sufficient under the circumstances.
We
hol,J that under; Mississippi precedent this conclusion was not in error.
545 F.2d at 443 (emphasis added).

-9-

the railroad as a mitt

j

In ruling on this
the view and f i n d s

th a

t

''J ,1

j•.\

the>

t r l J

ti"

1

L,

l

11

t 1 JI 1 I

or recognize the oncominy train 0r

Jr

t:

t I

I

t

'">, i i ( J

:

In so finding,

f.

II

t ' s •: 'n 1u L I

t :...,

l

r _'

t

I • ) rI

J/ ,.

(JU t t

c)'f 1,_

t

1

n Ln l

i

l :-:

( )t

n c; t n s-

the warniny devices

t•i

that were in operation was the sole
accident."

n

cause of the

the court tailed to evaluate the

crossing in light of its dangerous condition.

The following

evidence was undisputed, and establishes liability as a matter
There were several obstructions to the plaintiff's view

law.

including a box car, trees and a junk yard.

In addition, First

East was a relatively unused crossing which had suddenly been
converted into a highway,

increasing traffic over it by 48 times

Visibility was poor because of the darkness, and there were no
flashing semaphores which Mr. Hobbs was accustomed to seeing.
flagman had been stationed at the crossing, which Mr.
undoubtedly had seen early in the day,

Hobbs

but the flagman had left

the crossing, and no one was left to warn of an approaching
train.

The crossing to the west which previously handled most rn

their traffic with flashing warning lights had been deemed to bE
so hazardous and inadequate that the State and Railroad had
elected to improve the positioning of the warning lights to
overhead positions and to install a barrier arm.
Plaintiff submits that although the court found that the
crossing was not extra hazardous,

it failed

established in Bridges, supra, and Denkers,
determination.

to apply the tests
supra,

to make its

An application of those tests are as follows:

-10-

!'he ccint tc;ur1t i'Jrl in the land blocked plaintiff Hobbs'

l.

)t

'j

1 :; 1 (

J''''k

In•

;-H·<i

fhl'O c.·onfl,]Uration included foliage from trees
tn fr,Jnt uf

the line of sight of a driver.

fhee ,_·,mftcducalion of

L,

the railroad tracks was such that

•he plaintiff had to cross, at a maximum speed of 5 miles per
hour,

a full

five sets of ca1lroad tracks prior to safely nego-

tiating the crossing.
3.
shed, a

Structures in the vicinity included homes, a metal
junk yard, a van, and a box car along the side track

which obstructed the plaintiff's view.
4.

Testimony on the nature and amount of traffic on the

highway indicated that traffic flows had increased measurably
from approximately 230 vehicles per day to over 11,000 vehicles
per day.
5.

The State and Railroad had already determined that the

same amount of traffic over an improved crossing required flashing
warning lights and automated barrier arms which lower when trains
approach.
6.

Other conditions which contributed to the accident

included the fact that the accident occurred at night and that a
flagman had been posted at the crossing during the day which
would give rise to an assumption that someone was protecting
those ccossing the railroad crossing.

In addition, several

accidents had previously occurred at the intersection which
ptcJVed its dangerous condition, and also placed the Railroad and
the State of Utah on notice of the danger.
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presentt-

and is reversible error.
f'<llNT I I
THE RAILROAD WAS NFGLIGFNT IN THE OPERATION
OF ITS TRAIN.
It is undisputerl that the engineer did not see and could
see the truck until he was SO to 150 feet

from impact.

no1

This is

because the configuration of the cab was such that he could not
see forward and to the left
Hobbs was coming.

(Tr.

399),

the direction from which

Ganser was totally dependent upon warnings

given him from Leonard, the front end brakeman, or Harvey, who
was sitting in the same seat.

Neither said anything to him up tc

150 feet before impact.
The Court will take judicial notice, and it was established
by proof, that at 40 m.p.h.
60 feet per second.

the train is traveling approximately

It is also known that there is at least

second involved for perception and reaction time so that the
engineer had aproximately a second's notice of the impending
collision in spite of the fact that the truck in its motion was
clearly visible by the defendant's calculation and argument for
24 seconds.
It is clear that the Railroad had a duty to maintain a
lookout for approaching automobiles.
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Alires v.

Southern Pacific

1_·"·•

'73

il.riz.

, ,, t 11.it_
nl

11,,_1

:he

I

·"·'/

cuurt

11

92U-21

(1963).

370

f.'.2d

.vt,()

wd.s

apparently seated on the side of the engine

pJcilJ1tltl'S

ti"·
.J11'1

'Jl3,

Yi,

1

The train fireman

Vei11cle COll1ded, WaS looking the

11'1 n<lt .-;ee the µla1nt1ff's vehicle approaching.

neld that

this state of facts would

justify a

jury

tnstruction un wanton negligence.
It was clearly negligence for

the Railroad in the instant

to:
a)

Operate a train at any speed which did not afford

the engineer a clear view to the left and right.
b)
this

To operate a train at 40 m.p.h.

or 30 m.p.h. at

location and under these circumstances.
The trial court's findings that the Railroad was 100% negli-

gence free was contrary to the clear weight of the evidence and
should be reversed.
POINT II I
THE STATE OF UTAH HAD A DUTY TO MAINTAIN A
SAFE RAILROAD CROSSING.
The trial court in its decision stated that the State of
lltah was not negligent and failed to reach the question of whether
the State was immune from suit under the governmental immunity
doctrine.
reached,

Because the issue of governmental immunity was never
only a general discussion of negligence principles as

U1ey apply to the State 1s necessary.
The plaintiff contends that

the State was largely respons-

tb1le for the repair work being conducted at the intersection
where the accident occurred, and that

-13-

it is subject to the same

standard of care as is the Ra1 lrnad.
Transportation officials m,1'1•c

t 11··
l'

'Nf1•: f ,,
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r-11(_'

',,;J i t f l ] r1

rj,

be employed.
Utah has adopted the phil0snµl1y that

.i

[><>llt1cal entit1 may be

held liable for actions or inact1•rns in traffic contrul which
endanger the public.

See Fli•;ielow "· lnyersol,

1980); Carroll v. State,

27 Utah 2d 3CJ4,

Bramel v. State Road Commission,
( 1970).

618 P.2d 50 (Utah

496 P.2d 888 ( 1972);

24 Utah 2d 50,

465 P.2d 534

The defendant State of Utah had the same responsibility

as the Railroad to evaluate the condition of the crossing,
according to the Bridges tests, and to adequately protect the
crossing where increased traffic would be occurring because of
its detour.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDINGS AND
ALLOCATION OF NEGLIGENCE.
Appeal courts are reluctant to reverse trial decisions on
factual grounds, and are only willing to do so when the weight of
the evidence is clearly contrary to the judgment.
Hendrickson,

27 Utah 2d 251, 495 P.2d 28

of negligence is also a factual

issue.

Division v. Coulson, 620 P.2d 549

(Wyo.

(1972).

1980).
in com[Jar-

and impose its own allocation

of fault to comform to the evidence at trial.
1979).

however,

review the percentage allocations of

negligence by the finder or fact,

407 A.2d 310 (Me.

The allocation

Buttrey Food Stores

The trial court or the appeals court may,
ative negligence cases,

Hardy v.

Mazo v. Malone,

In the case of Kinsey v.
-14-

Kelly,

312

'• c•J
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Li.

,.;,1'·

'1 11r1t,

,

,1

Ai'I'·

1q·;s1,

Jr 1'11n1J

the plaintiff was driving a motor-

in

the opposite

direction in an

''""''1 J'.'• ,Jt\•"mµted r.o mdke a left hand turn in front of the

I' [ ,n r1t 1 ff.

fhe pla1nt1tt had seen the defendant pull out into

thP intersection and stop, and plaintiff thought that the defen,Jant was goinrd tu wait for him to pass through the intersect1on.

Instead,

the defendant turned in front of the motorcycle

which collided with the defendant's car.
that the plaintiff was

oi necJligent.

At trial the jury found

negligent, and that the defendant was

The appeals court reversed the decision by saying:

The case was tried on comparative negligence.
By its verdict for the appellee, the jury
necessarily considered that she was without
negligence which was a legal cause of the
accident, and that appellant's negligence was

100%.

While the trial and appellate courts are
not authorized to substitute their judgment
for that of the jury on disputed questions of
fact, a new trial should be granted when the
verdict is against the manifest weight of the
evidence.
Here, the record clearly shows at
least some degree of negligence on the part
of the appellee.
We therefore, find that
this verdict was against the manifest weight
of the evidence and that the trial judge
abused his discretion in denying appellant's
motion for a new trial.
312 So.2d at 462 (emphasis added).

This case is similar to the Kinsey case in that, viewing the
undisputed facts presented at trial, as a matter of law there was
lecest some derJcee of neyl1gence on the part of defendant Denver
R10 Grande Western Railroad and the State of Utah.
tcattic,

The increased

the obstructions to view, the absence of the flagman,
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against the weight of the evidenccc.
Another case where the rev1ewiny court reversed on the
percent allocation of negligence is Lawver v. City of Park Falls,
35 Wis.

2d 308, 151 N.W.2d 68

( 1967).

In Lawver,

the plaintiff

was forced to walk as a pedestrian in the snow covered streets
because
walks.

Park Falls City had failed to plow the side
While walking on the street,

large piece of ice, and fell,

the plaintiff stepped on a

injuring her ankle.

The plaintiff

brought a negligence action against the City, and the jury found
that she was 75% negligent,

the City 25% negligent, and she was

denied any recovery under the Wisconsin comparative negligence
statute.

The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed the case based

on the erroneous allocation by the jury, and said:
There is no question the City was negligent
in not plowing or shoveling the snow on the
north sidewalk, but we cannot agree with the
plaintiff's contentions that she could not be
negligent in her manner of walking or in her
position in the street because she was forced
to walk there.
However, the apportionment of negligence
is such that it cannot be sustained.
We
think as a matter of law that 75% causal
negligence attributable to a pedestrian
forced to walk in the public street ann who
stumbles over ice ruts is unreasonably disproportionate to the negligence of the City in
failing to keep its sidewalks shovelled.
Here we think the apportionment of
negligence cannot be sustainen either on the
evidence or as a matter of law.
While it can
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'"-' '"rJu>_·•J tr1cit puhlic sidewalks in small
t >wn' i ri the fdr north which are subject to
tr'
snow fcills and little pedestrian
r r 1 t ti,· cd11n0t tie kept as clean of snow as
l l / streets in a metropolitan city in southern
'<H s ·' 'n '-' l n , n eve r the 1 es s , a C i t y does have the
d1Jt '/ to keep 1 ts sidewalks reasonably safe
urider all the conditions for pedestrian
traftic.
N.W.

at

There

7U.
ts no question that the Railroad and the State had a

duty to make the railroad crossing safe.
§

56-1-11

(1974).

Utah Code Ann.

The factual circumstances discussed above

prove that the failure of the defendants to remedy certain conditions was a breach of their duty of care.

In Lawver, the plain-

tiff had a duty to look and did not see the obstructions that
caused her fall.

This duty,

however, did not preclude her from

recovering or make her action completely negligent, nor did it
even sustain a negligent allocation of 75% to her and 25% to the
defendant City.
In the instant case,
and listen.

the plaintiff had a duty to stop,

look

Some negligence on plaintiff Hobbs' part, however,

does not conclusively establish a bar to his recovery.

The very

purpose of comparative negligence was to prevent the harsh
results of the contributory negligence doctrine which denied a
plaintiff recovery when fault ought to be fairly allocated among
the rart ies.
P.?d

1247

Rigtrup v. Strawberry Water Users Association, 563

(Utah 1977).

rh,.. de[ce11dants,

In this case, despite undisputed fault by

the tinder of fact failed to allocate fault among

the parties but simply determined that because plaintiff Hobbs
•l1d

nut see the trian,

his own negligence was the sole proximate
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cause of the accident and his
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sively used, cit iny tra It ic
The crossing was only
stop sign.

<>t

l,

1 ,,,

clll•.!

17 trains •iaily.

tiy sLit1•lcJrd crossbucks and a re"

The driver of the car .3t•)ppe11 t)ef•)re reaching the

first track, but the cross1 nq had multiµle tracks and he did not
stop for each track.

several sight obstructions and the angle

the sun blocked the driver's visiori, and his car was struck by
the defendant's train while he attempted to cross the tracks.
At trial there was disputed evidence as to whether the
defendant's train was sounding the required warnings.

The plain-

tiffs also contended that the crossing was extra hazardous based
on the inadequacy of the warninys and the obstructions to the
driver's view.

The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff an:

the defendant appealed.
On appeal, the defendant argued that because the Arkansas
statute required a stop between fifteen and fifty feet before a
railroad track, that the plaintiff was negligent per se.
appeals court rejected this argument:
A significant facet of this argument is that
Thomas approached the crossiny charged, under
§ 75-637, n. 3 supra, with the duty of brinqing his automobTieto a stop within fifty
feet and not less than fifteen feet ot the
nearest ra i 1.
We already have observed that
this statutory duty does not become applicable unless the
emits an audible
signal from a distance cf not less than
fifteen hundred feet ot the crossiny, or
-18-

The

ur>lc·ss U1e train is plainly visible.
In
11'-'.V ()ft-lit-:" ,_·rJntrr)versy on
thE::- signal issue,
.-Jrid
[Ji-_·c,111St-.: a v1()lat1r"Jn of
the statute can
_5' 1-me 1:·1 idence of negligence,
, (_' , f ') c e x a rn 1) l , 8 u s s e l l v . Mi s sou r i
I·1•lt11. f<.J1lr•1all Co., 237 Ark. 812 376
I 1964 I, we are unable to
view the statue as one having dispositive
significance.
1

<l'>M

r.2rl at 646 n.

15 (emphasis adrled).

The Arkansas statute is very similar to the statute in Utah
requiring the plaintiff to stop between 15 to 50 feet from a
railroad track.

Any negligence by the plaintiff Hobbs of not

stopping, or failing to see the train,
his negligence.

All other

is not conclusive as to

needed to be considered,

including those factors already cited which would contribute to
the extra hazardous condition of the railroad crossing.
In this case,

instead of evaluating the circumstances, the

findings of fact are devoid of any factual finding other than a
statement that the plaintiff had clear vision towards the train
during a short period of time that the intersection was safe.
There was no finding as to the increase in traffic,
sight obstructions,

the specific

the color of the train, or the flagman who

had previously been employed, etc.

Yet the court held that the

crossing was not hazardous as a matter of law.

This was clearly

an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court and warrants
d

reversal.
CONCLUSION
Mr.

Austin Hubbs was struck by a train at the First East
The trial court determined that the Railroad

ctfl11

the State were absolutely without fault with respect to the
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accident,

and that the sole caus<-' •)f

gence of Mr.
erroneous.

Hohbs.
The

The

r-ri,11

1

1
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l1rt

even by heavy trucks.

tr

Tht:'

F

rough that the maximum speed for a
5 m.p.h.

I .•.

11

,_.l!?dt-l·,

railroad crossin9 this v11-lt: !icL'm.p.h.

3,_,,-1

1

r::;t

l'. f"l

r'a::JL

l<!a<J,,,1

Numerous objects blocked 'Ir.

CL<JSS l rlj

':J-.:1S

S

1

J

t1-uck -was al'[Jroxirnate

Hnbbs'

view.

The appellant acknowledges that there were times when
Hobbs was between obstructions and perhaps could have seen the
engine lights on the train had he been looking in that directi0
at that time;

however, Mr.

Hobbs obviously did not know from

which direction a train might be coming, and he was required to
look in numerous other directions during the 24 seconds he was
crossing the tracks.

Because of the dark color of the train,

only the engine lights would have been visible.

The opportunit:

to catch a brief glimpse of the engine of the train if one
to be looking in the right direction is simply not enough,
matter of law,

as a

to absolve the Railroad and the State from lia-

bility for failure to remove the obstructions from the crossing

or to install lights or other devices which would warn persons '.
an approaching train.

The evidence also clearly established that the Railroad wa!
negligent, and the trial court's ruling to the contrary was
against the clear weight of the evidence.

The evidence showe-1

that some of the train personnel were aware of
stantially before the collision,
prevent a collision.

but failed

In addition,
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the truck suh-

to take any action

r

the design of the train enyir
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baserl upon the foreyo1nq,
that

1

neer was

ob st r-ucted

so that

a[Jproaching vehicles, and he

the appellant respectfully requests

the rlecision of the trial court be reversed, and the case
for a new trial.
day of August, 1983.

DATED

HOWARD,
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant

MAILED two copies of the foregoing to Mr. E. Scott Savage,
Esq.,

50 South Main Street, Suite 1600, P.O. Box 3400, Salt Lake

City, Utah 84110, and to Mr.

Stuart L. Poelman, Esq., P.O. Box

3000, Salt Lake City, Utah 84110, postage prepaid, this
of August,

1983.

SECRETARY
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;8fr.--day

CORNWALL

McCARTHY

for Defendant The Denver

Grande Western Railroad Company
SO Suutlt Main Street, Suite 1600

SHlt Lake City, Utah

Teleehone:

& Rio

,-.l,. \_{l

_

84144

(801) 532-3333

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
AUSTIN HOBBS,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT

vs.

AND

COtlCLUSIONS OF LAW

THE DENVER
RIO GRANDE
WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY; and
STATE OF UTAH, DEPARTMENf
OF 7RANSPOR7A'l'ICll<,

Civil No, C-80-5688

Defendants.

On November 30 through December 3, 1982, this matter
was tried before the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick of the aboveentitled Court, sitting without a jury.

represented Plaintiff.

Jackson B. Howard

Alan L. Sullivan and Jeffrey E. Nelson

represented defendant The Denver

Company (the "Railroad 11 ) .

& Rio Grande Western Railroad

Stuart L. Poelman represented defen-

dant State of Utah, Department of Transportation (the "DOT").

Plaintiff called the following witnesses to testify on
his behalf:

Steven Douros, Dr. Robert Lamb, Reese Blackhurst,

Archie Hamilton, Gerald Leonard, Martin Ganser, Austin Hobbs,
and Betty Hobbs.

Plaintiff also read into the record all or

part ,)f tt1e depositions of Arland Esklund, Chad Chesnut, John
Cule, and Dwayne Russell.

The Railroad called James Harvey,

1

Cameron E. Ha.1J.".l'""'''· Ht:"d r

11

ses on
In addition to lhe tPst1m.1n, ,1f the i..'i!

numerous exhi-

bits were introduced into
On the bas Ls

t!ie te..,;t imonv and evidence adduced at

trial, the Court makes the following findings of fact:
FINDINGS _OF FACT
1.

At about 10:00 r.m. on April 23, 1979, while

driving a coal-hauling tractor-trailer truck in connection with
his employment, Plaintiff was involved in a collision with one
of the Railroad's trains at the Railroad's crossing located
between Second and Third South on First East in Price, Utah.
2.
of tracks.

The First East crossing is composed of five sets
The northernmost of these tracks is the active or

"mainline 11 track.
occurred.

It was on this track that the collision

The tracks approach First East from a slightly east-

southeasterly direction.

The mainline track is straight for

more than three-quarters of a mile to the east of the First
East crossing.
3.
Price.

The Railroad's tracks also cross Carbon Avenue in

On the day of the accident, the Carbon Avenue crossing

was closed because of repair work being performed there at the
direction of the DOT.

The DOT detoured traffic from Carbon

Avenue to First East to permit Railroad and DOT crews to complete the work, which was to take about three to five days.
4.

The DOT made the decision to detour traffic from

Carbon Avenue to First East.

The decision was made after a

meeting called by the DOT on April 6, 1979, attended by representatives of the DOT, the Railroad, and Price City.

-2 -

At the

meeting, it was determined that it would be impractical to
rermit traffic to continue across the Carbon Avenue crossing
tt1e construction.

Another alternative considered at the

meeting was that traffic be diverted to First West.

However,

the DO':' decided to detour traffic to First East for several
reasons,

including, but not limited to, the following:

(1)

there was less existing traffic on First East than on First
West;

(2) the housing and population of children were less

dense on First East;

(3) the turns along the First East detour

route were easier to negotiate, particularly for large coal
trucks; and (4) the First East crossing was in better condition
and could more easily accommodate the additional traffic, including the large coal trucks.

The chosen detour diverted

traffic traveling northbound on Carbon Avenue right (east) on
Third South, left (north) on First East across the tracks to
First South, left (west) on First South, then right (north) on
Carbon Avenue.
5.

Before the construction began, the warning sig-

nals at the First East crossing consisted of white
signs that had been there for many years.

11

crossbuck

11

The DOT installed

additional yellow railroad warning signs before the detour was
imposed.

The Railroad imposed a "slow order" during the con-

struction, requiring its trains to reduce their speed from 40
m.p.h. to 30 m.p.h.

from milepost 619.0 to 619.5 during the

period of the construction.

Milepost 619.0 was located about

100 feet east of the First East crossing, and milepost 619.5
was located one-half mile west of milepost 619.0.
6.

The train crew in the lead engine on the night of

the accident consisted of the engineer (Martin Ganser), the
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head brakeman

,,

L:•L

;

ment (James Har.ievl.

Mr.

vision anJ

Jf tl1e

H,in. ..:\'..,

seated in the lead englne on

r,1,1

dulie::-,

t 1t1'mu:1

,if

inc.:luded the super-

crews, and he was
tt1P

night uf the accident for the

purpose, among others, of observing and evaluating the crew's
performance.
7.

As the train approached Price on the night of the

accident, the train engineer reduced the speed of the train
from approximately 60 m.p.h. to 40 m.p.h. or less in accordance
with the applicable Price City ordinance.

The train engineer

further reduced the speed of the train to 30 m.p.h. or less at
milepost 619.0 in accordance with the Railroad's slow order.
8.

As the Railroad's train approached to within a

quarter mile of the First East crossing, its locomotive bell
was ringing, the fixed and oscillating headlights on the front
of its locomotive were burning, and the train engineer sounded
the standard whistle signal, composed of two long blasts followed by one short blast and one long blast.
9.

On the night of the accident, Plaintiff drove

north on Carbon Avenue, then followed the detour route that led
him east on Third South, then north on First East.

Plaintiff

knew that the northernmost track was the mainline track and he
was acquainted with the First East crossing because he crossed

it traveling south earlier on the day of the accident.

Fur-

thermore, Plaintiff had crossed the Carbon Avenue crossing
frequently during the six years he had worked for his employer
before the accident.

10.

As Plaintiff appcoacheJ tl1e First East crossing,

he slowed his truck to approximately 3 to 5 m.p.h., but failed
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tr

c

JCJv

sing
ar

,i

C·)mplet<-' stop at any point before or on the cros-

Plaintiff had a clear view of the approaching train for

[e,-,1st t'1e last 110 feet before he reached the mainline

track, except for a very brief period when his view of the lead
engine was obstructed by a stationary boxcar parked approximately 140 feet east of the crossing on a storage track.

After

passing that obstruction, Plaintiff had a clear view of the
approaching train for more than 10 seconds before he reached
the mainline track and with ample time to bring his truck to a
stop.

Plaintiff proceeded across the crossing at approximately

3 to 5 m.p.h. and either failed to look or listen for the train
or failed to heed what he saw or heard as the train approached.

11.

James Harvey, who was sitting in the left front

seat of the train engine cab, saw Plaintiff's truck approaching
the crossing but assumed that, because the truck was decelerating and approaching the crossing so slowly, Plaintiff
intended to stop.

Gerald Leonard, seated behind Mr, Harvey,

also saw Plaintiff's truck approaching the mainline track.
When Mr. Harvey and Mr. Leonard realized that the truck was not
going to stop before the mainline track, they simultaneously
warned Martin Ganser.

At that time, the train could not be

stopped short of the crossing.

Mr. Ganser saw the truck and

immediately applied the train's emergency brakes.
On the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, the
Court makes the following conclusions of law:

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1.

The Railroad 1 s crew members exercised reasonable

c8.re and were not negligent in the operation of the train on
night of the accident.

The Railroad was not negligent with

respect to the design of the cab in its locomotive.

-5-

56-1-14 (Supp.

Code Ann.
----

191::\1) by s11unrling the train'b

whistle and bell continu,)usly fvr at ledst 80 rud'.:. (d quarter
mile) before crossing the First East crossing.
3.

The Railroad exercised reasu11able care in CTain-

taining the First East crossing.
4.

The DOT exercised reasonable care in the choice

of the detour route to First East and in the choice of crossing
protections required and installed at the First East crossing.

5.

The First East crossing was not an extrahazardous

crossing either because of volume of traffic, or the nature of
the First East crossing, or the presence of buildings or other
obstructions, or because of the circumstances prevailing on the
night of the accident.

Therefore, neither the DOT nor the

Railroad had a duty to place flagmen or additional warnings or
protections at the First East crossing.
6.

Plaintiff failed to exercise reasonable care in

approaching and crossing the First East crossing.

Plaintiff's

failure to see or hear what a reasonable person could have seen
or heard, or to heed what he saw or heard, constituted negligence per se.

Plaintiff's negligence was the sole proximate

cause of Plaintiff's accident and injuries.
7.

Plaintiff failed to comply with Utah Code Ann.

41-6-95(a) (1981) because he failed to stop within 50 feet
but not less than 10 feet from the First East crossing when the
Railroad's train was approaching within approximately 1,500
feet of the crossing and emitting an audible signal, and when
the train, because of its speed and nearness to the First East
crossing, constituted an immediate

-6-

and because the

Kailrt1d1J's

train was plainly visible and was in

hdzdrdous proximity to the First
DATED this

_;J.jliray

of

, 1982.

BY THE COURT:

Approved as to form:

Jackson B. Howard

Attorney for Plaintiff

Attorney for Defendant State of Utah,
Department of Transportation
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